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█ Abstract Emotions are currently at the center of a lively international and interdisciplinary debate. The 
first sections of this essay present a synthetic overview of its key features. The main sections provide a re-
examination of one of the most historically significant developments in the field of affective studies. René 
Descartes’ approach to the study of emotions implies a positive assessment of the role of the body and a 
remarkable attenuation of his classical dualism that allows an innovative perspective on the subject. He 
inaugurated a new scientific style of research, which is one of the original sources of some key concepts of 
the current research. 
KEYWORDS: Emotions; René Descartes; Embodied Cognition; Classification of Emotions; Philosophy of 
Emotions 
 
█ Riassunto Le emozioni di Descartes: dal corpo al corpo – Le emozioni sono attualmente al centro di un 
dibattito internazionale e interdisciplinare molto vivace, di cui la prima sezione del saggio presenta una 
panoramica sintetica. La sezione principale propone un’analisi critica di uno dei passaggi storicamente più 
significativi nel campo dello studio dei fenomeni emotivi. L’approccio di Descartes al tema delle emozioni 
presuppone una considerazione positiva del ruolo del corpo e una notevole attenuazione del dualismo per 
cui è noto, consentendo così una prospettiva innovativa al tema. Descartes inaugura un nuovo stile di ri-
cerca che è alle origini di alcuni concetti chiave della ricerca contemporanea. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Emozioni; René Descartes; Conoscenza incarnata; Classificazione delle emozioni; Filoso-
fia delle emozioni 
 
 
 
EMOTIONS PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE in our 
lives, profoundly influencing their quality and 
overall meaning. Over the centuries, human 
emotions have been discussed by many of the 
greatest philosophers – from Plato, Aristotle 
and the Stoics up to Descartes, Spinoza, 
Hobbes, Hume, Kant and James – all of whom 
developed various sophisticated theories to ex-
plain how a person`s emotions reflect the po-
tential responses to salient events in their lives. 
During the first decades of the Twentieth 
century, the primacy of reductionist scientific 
paradigms led to a sharp decrease in interest 
in the theory of emotion; however the topic 
has recently regained a central place in the 
fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences and 
neurosciences, and is currently the focus of 
numerous research programs. This renewed 
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academic interest has spurred a lively interna-
tional debate that has clarified, among other 
things, how a satisfactory understanding of 
the emotions cannot be achieved from a single 
disciplinary perspective. 
This essay focuses on the topic from both a 
historical and a theoretical point of view. The 
first section examines some of the key features 
of the current debate on the emotions that are 
of particular relevance to my approach, such as 
their cognitive value, and questioned universal 
meaning. The main section provides an histori-
cal analysis of some of the most significant de-
velopments in the field of affective studies, 
such as the shift from “passions” to “emotions” 
and the complex mind-body relationship. 
These new scenarios originated in the seven-
teenth century, particularly in connection with 
René Descartes, who not only devised a revolu-
tionary philosophical method in traditional ar-
eas such as metaphysics, physics, mathematics 
and physiology, but also developed a complete-
ly innovative approach to the study of the emo-
tions, which he considered from an essentially 
scientific point of view: «en physicien». 
My thesis is that by recovering and rein-
terpreting the perspectives developed by 
Descartes we can enrich the current debate 
on emotions and their bodily expression. The 
unique dialogue that he established with the 
natural sciences is of particular relevance to 
current research debates, which often ques-
tion the epistemological premises of studies 
on the emotions. It is also hoped that a his-
torical survey may provide a much-needed 
antidote to today`s all too common uncritical 
acceptance of the perspectives and terminol-
ogy of current academic research. In other 
words, the history of ideas can provide very 
useful tools with which to avoid the danger 
of “presentist” methodological assumptions 
that underestimate the original sources of 
some key concepts. 
 
█  The contemporary debate I: Feeling and 
appraisal theories 
 
Recent studies1 have identified some of 
the main questions that need to be addressed 
by the affective sciences. Among them, two 
seem to be crucial: the first concerns their na-
ture or “what the emotions really are”, a 
question that entails ontological as well as 
empirical issues and has significant repercus-
sions on their possible classification. In a nut-
shell, the question can be summarized as fol-
lows: should we regard emotions as feelings 
or appraisals? 
The so-called feeling theories conceive 
emotions as affective states, which are essen-
tially feelings that differ from sensations or 
perceptions because of their subjectively ex-
perienced quality. One of the earliest propo-
nents of this view, William James, re-
evaluated the role of the body in a famous 
article published in Mind (1884), characteriz-
ing emotions as by-products of processes that 
take place in the autonomic nervous system. 
According to James, emotions are feelings 
triggered by the bodily changes caused by 
certain stimuli: we do not «cry, strike, or 
tremble, because we are sorry, angry, of fear-
ful, as the case may be» but «we feel sorry 
because we cry, angry because we strike, 
afraid because we tremble […] Bodily chang-
es follow directly the perception of the excit-
ing fact and our feeling of the same changes 
as they occur IS the emotion».2 While this 
provocative view was severely criticized in 
the first decades of the twentieth century, it 
has recently attracted new interest, especially 
in the light of the crucial new insights pro-
vided by the neurosciences. 
The so-called appraisal theories, by con-
trast, rest on the hypothesis that emotions are 
essentially intentional events, cognitive states. 
Emotions are necessarily “about something”, 
in the sense that they are evaluative judg-
ments, or “appraisals”3 that refer to our well-
being and assess the significance of the situa-
tions we find ourselves in: are they threaten-
ing and harmful, or beneficial and rewarding, 
for our body and mind? If emotions are ap-
praisals, they belong to the realm of intelligent 
thought and action, like other cognitive 
events, and are not alien influences that affect 
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and overpower our rational will. Therefore, 
reason and the emotions are not contradictory 
and conflicting powers of mind.4  
 
█  The contemporary debate II: Are emotions 
natural kinds or social constructs? 
 
Another hotly debated contemporary 
question is how we learn and identify emo-
tions. Should we regard emotions as natural 
(kinds), i.e. universally recognizable phenom-
ena, or should we conceive them as cultural 
constructs and, therefore, analyze them only 
within the context in which they take place? 
From an epistemic point of view, emo-
tions can be regarded as natural kinds, i.e. 
objects that we can interpret from a scientific 
point of view and that we classify following 
the same methodology as we would use for 
any other kind of natural object. The “basic 
emotion approach”, also known as the stand-
ard approach, is grounded in the belief that 
certain categories of emotion reflect univer-
sal biological states, and are triggered by ded-
icated neural circuits preserved by evolution 
(the so-called affect programs), expressed by 
unambiguous bodily and facial behaviors, 
and accompanied by subjective feeling and 
instrumental action.5 Darwin’s thesis in The 
Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals 
(1874) is still accepted by most scholars, who 
believe that expressions of emotions are uni-
versal events, which can be recognized cross-
culturally, and also characterize some animal 
species.6 Faces display emotional information 
for everybody to read, just like a word on a 
page. Accordingly, classifications are based 
on a precise set of fundamental (discrete) 
emotions – such as fear, anger, surprise, dis-
gust, happiness, and sadness – which are 
shared by humans and animals and are usual-
ly distinguished by the following features: 
quick onset, automatic response, low aware-
ness, brief duration, physiological changes, 
specific and classifiable expressions.7 
The main objection raised by anthropolo-
gists and psychologists is that different cul-
tures often express emotions in different 
ways (they have different “display rules”), 
both with regard to their bodily expression 
and from a linguistic point of view.8 Recent 
cross-cultural surveys claim that a universal-
istic perspective is untenable and rigid classi-
fication useless. The basic assumption is that 
emotions form a continuum and that discrete 
boundaries between them are therefore arbi-
trary.9 Moreover, the fact that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to translate exactly many of 
the terms that describe specific emotions into 
different languages reflects the metaphysical 
nature of the idea of a “transparent” lan-
guage. From this perspective, emotions and 
their expressions can only be adequately un-
derstood within the original context in which 
they originate, and can only be studied as so-
cial constructions, which are strictly linked to 
specific, cultural categorizations. A dilemma 
remains, however: how can we speak of emo-
tions without a shared language? Some 
scholars have developed a new approach, 
taking cultural diversity into account but also 
allowing the possibility that some “emotional 
universals” can be established.10  
These contemporary debates have at-
tracted wide interest and are far from settled: 
universalistic approaches, while supported by 
a number of strong arguments, are also sub-
ject to some well-founded objections. I be-
lieve that some of the main issues of this in-
novative debate find their roots in seven-
teenth-century philosophy and science and 
that, as I will show in the following sections, 
a re-examination of these historical prece-
dents can significantly enrich our own ap-
proach. 
 
█  A “passionate” Descartes? 
 
The stereotype of Descartes is that of the 
quintessential rationalist and dualist philoso-
pher, whose scientific interests were remote 
from the world of emotions. His mechanistic 
approach does not seem appropriate for the 
affective sciences: it appears inadequate to ex-
plain the close interaction between body and 
mind that is generally assumed in research to-
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day. Some contemporary interpreters tend to 
accentuate the fundamental “Cartesian er-
ror”11 and to underplay the innovative ap-
proach to the passions expounded in Des-
cartes’ last work, Les Passions de l’âme (1649), 
where his dualism is considerably attenuated. 
My thesis claims that Descartes inaugu-
rates a new trend in this field,12 and that his 
ideas are, in fact, a necessary condition for, 
and the primary source of, today`s scientific 
approach. This is not at all obvious: my ar-
gument needs to be illustrated by texts, 
methodology, and language. A “passionate” 
Descartes appears, at first sight, unusual and 
inappropriate: I will try to define a new per-
spective on him regarding our topic.  
Descartes was encouraged to test his scien-
tific outlook in this field by a woman, the Bo-
hemian Princess Elisabeth, who, from 1643 to 
1649, carried out a very stimulating epistolary 
relationship with the philosopher13. Her corre-
spondent was immediately impressed by the 
accuracy of her objections to some key con-
cepts of his own philosophy. The crucial ques-
tion, addressed in her first letter of May 1643, 
is, of course, the mind-body problem. Follow-
ing rigorous Cartesian logic, she found the af-
firmation that an immaterial substance (res 
cogitans) could move a material substance (res 
extensa) – or vice versa – without touching a 
surface (as occurs in the world of bodies), con-
tradictory.14 You could only change the direc-
tion or speed of a body if you struck it directly 
– given the absence of void in the Cartesian 
world. How could a passion felt in the soul 
produce and rule the movements of the mus-
cles? I would prefer to conceive the soul as 
material,15 she insisted in a second letter, ra-
ther than contradict all the principles of the 
new philosophy. Descartes is clearly embar-
rassed by this incisive objection, but his an-
swer shows a deep awareness of the real con-
nection between the two substances, beyond 
stereotypes: 
 
Your highness observes that it is easier to 
attribute matter and extension to the soul 
than to attribute to it the capacity to 
move and be moved by the body without 
having such matter and extension. I beg 
her to feel free to attribute this matter and 
extension to the soul because that is simp-
ly to conceive it as united to the body.16 
 
 In an apparently oversimplified but not 
inconsistent argument, he had stated in a 
previous letter that we have to consider a 
third “primitive notion” in addition to those 
of the two substances: their union, a notion 
that does not need to be demonstrated be-
cause «it can be understood only through it-
self». 17 We human beings are living evidence 
that the soul is not a ghost in the machine or 
a pilot in a ship, as he wrote in the Medita-
tions: «I am very closely joined and, as it 
were, intermingled (quasi permixtum) with it 
[my body], so that I and the body form a uni-
ty».18 In the thirtieth article of Les Passions 
de l’âme he writes:  
 
But in order to understand all these things 
more perfectly, we need to recognize that 
the soul is really joined to the whole body, 
and that we cannot properly say that it ex-
ist in any one part of the body to the ex-
clusion of the others. For the body is a 
unity, which is in a sense indivisible be-
cause of the arrangement of its organs, 
these being so related to one another that 
the removal of any of them renders the 
whole body defective.19 
 
In his last work this perspective is explicit, 
but we can already find some hints of it in the 
Regulae ad directionem ingenii, written before 
1629,20 and in the Principia Philosophiae, 
published in 1644: it is not easy to demon-
strate that he was a spiritualist, who consid-
ered the mind a disembodied entity. Even in 
the famous passages of the second and third 
Meditation in which he demonstrates the ex-
istence of the cogito independent of the res 
extensa, the real distinction between body 
and mind presupposes the possibility of a 
clear definition of the body.21 The hypothet-
ical way in which the cogito is demonstrated 
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implies a continuous reference to the world 
of the body, towards which our way of think-
ing inclines. The conclusion of the sixth 
Meditation – with the demonstration of the 
effective existence of external bodies and 
consequently the reliability of our sensory 
perception – appears, following recent inter-
pretations, to be the real, but dissimulated, 
aim of the whole work.22 Descartes’ interest 
in science, i.e. in the world of bodies and 
their mechanisms, is evident even in the 
Meditations, the treatise that has been the ba-
sis for most spiritualistic interpretations of 
Descartes’ thought. His scientific attitude is, 
naturally, a fortiori evident in his works in 
this area: l’Homme, for instance, and, of 
course, Les passions de l’âme.  
This is also why, in his answer to the prefa-
tory letter23 to the latter work, he writes that 
he will not deal with the passions as a moral 
philosopher or as a rhetorician (in the Aristo-
telian tradition), «but as a natural philoso-
pher (en physicien)».24 Descartes intended to 
analyze the passions from a scientific perspec-
tive, moving away from the traditional, purely 
“humanistic”, approach, taking into account 
the crucial role played by the body in the 
mechanism of the passions. This is a decisive 
turning point, which affects not only the con-
tent of the treatise, but also the Cartesian lexi-
con: the word emotion is used here for the first 
time to define passion,25 a choice that also had 
a significant impact on the subsequent Eng-
lish-speaking tradition.  
The conceptual theological overtones of 
the word “passion” are avoided if the word 
“emotion” begins to be employed, as it occurs 
in Hume’s works, after his period of study in 
France.26 “Passion”, and “affection”, were tra-
ditionally used in moral and theological con-
texts and often carried a negative connota-
tion: they referred to behaviors in which the 
soul played a passive role. Aquinas considers 
passivity as potentiality, and therefore as im-
perfection, a deficiency that precisely 
measures the distance from God and from 
perfection.27 The world of the passions is 
based on the tenth Aristotelian category, pas-
sivity, or the state of being acted upon. Aqui-
nas particularly emphasizes that the most 
proper sense of passion is recognizable in its 
being dragged, and in its receding from what 
is suitable to it.28 Nevertheless, his attitude 
towards the passions is not completely con-
demnatory, as is that of the Stoics:29 when 
ruled and directed by reason, the passions, as 
motions, can increase the value of individual 
human actions.30  
Despite the fact that tradition and moder-
nity share some basic concepts, the signifi-
cance of these concepts, shaped by new con-
texts, is frequently very different to previous 
meanings. It is important to stress that the 
word “emotion”, derived from the French 
“émotion”, is usually employed in scientific 
contexts, with a more neutral connotation, in 
which the explanation of its mechanism is the 
primary focus. “Emotion” is not immediately 
linked to passivity: its motion does not neces-
sarily imply that it is being dragged, nor is it 
inevitably heading for the worse. An “emo-
tion” can be explained through its causes and 
effects and physical and psychological pro-
cesses; taking into account the relationship 
between the body and its viscera, the brain 
processes and the corresponding ideas in the 
mind. Descartes and Aquinas share a concep-
tion of the passions as motions, but its conno-
tation has changed: in the Cartesian treatise 
the conceptual pair activity-passivity does not 
refer to contradictory behaviors, but to the 
same entity, differently named, according to 
the subject to which it is related.31 The role of 
passivity has weakened considerably. Passions 
are defined as follows:  
 
[…] those perceptions, sensations or emo-
tions of the soul which we refer particu-
larly to it, and which are caused, main-
tained and strengthened by some move-
ments of the spirits. 32 
 
They are caused by the movement of the 
animal spirits (the subtlest and fastest part of 
the blood), which produces – and also main-
tains and strengthens – them, in order to pre-
Descartes’ Emotions: From the Body to the Body 
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serve the body and to improve its perfec-
tion.33 From the body to the body: this is the 
logic of the Cartesian passions. Their pres-
ence lasts in time and increases energy levels, 
their positive function is explicitly stressed:  
 
From what has been said it is easy to rec-
ognize that the utility of all passions con-
sist simply in the fact that they strengthen 
and prolong thoughts in the soul which is 
good for the soul to preserve and which 
otherwise might easily be erased from it.34  
 
They are the necessary condition for the 
preservation and well-being of the body: 
without their swift informative reactions, we 
are defenseless in the face of danger. They 
play an essential role in maintaining the gen-
eral balance of the whole organism, including 
its mind. They do not threaten reason: on the 
contrary, they help man to acquire an ade-
quate knowledge of the world. In formulat-
ing this definition Descartes states that it is 
meaningful to call the passions “emotions” 
because they shake (esbranlent)35 the soul, 
producing a change in the interior landscape, 
but not necessarily undermining its stability: 
an emotion signals the internal effect of an 
external event that has previously either 
helped or harmed the body.36 Using the con-
temporary lexicon we could call them adap-
tive changes elicited by an alteration in the 
environment, phenomena that require an in-
ternal adjustment to external dynamics. It is 
indeed surprising that Descartes can still be 
crudely labeled a “dualist”.37 
Unlike Aristotle, Descartes believed that 
the passions are felt in the soul, but the heart 
is also involved, as testified by the numerous 
spirits and the quantity of blood that support 
the persistence of passions among our 
thoughts. This is the second reason why we 
call them emotions.38 We can only metaphor-
ically affirm that passions are felt in the 
heart, since their seat is the soul – or mind: 
but the mechanical explanation based on the 
movement of the spirits allows him to affirm 
that we can feel them “as if” they were in the 
heart.39 This shift from heart to soul, and the 
brain activity of which Descartes also speaks, 
make up another element of the paradigm 
shift introduced by Descartes towards a sci-
entific rather than moral or rhetorical ap-
proach to the passions. 
Further traces in a direction moving to-
wards contemporary “feeling”, or “Jamesian” 
theories, can be found in a passage in which 
Descartes emphasizes that the movements of 
the spirits in the nerves (for instance in the legs 
in flight) and the change in the pineal gland are 
simultaneous, and therefore allow the soul to 
feel and perceive «this action. In this way, the 
body may be moved to take flight by the mere 
disposition of the organs, without any contri-
bution of the soul».40 Both cognitive value and 
the relevance of feeling are stressed in a way 
that is far from “obsolete”. 
 
█  A unitary and “embodied” conception of 
mind 
 
Nevertheless, the traditional interpreta-
tion is not devoid of all value. In order to re-
inforce his proposal’s discontinuity with tra-
dition, Descartes states clearly in the first line 
of his work: 
 
Next I note that we are not aware of any 
subject with acts more directly upon our 
soul than the body to which it is joined. 
Consequently we should recognize that 
what is a passion in the soul is usually an 
action in the body. Hence there is no better 
way of coming to know about our passions 
than by examining the difference between 
the soul and the body, in order to learn to 
which of the two we should attribute each 
of the functions present in us.41 
 
Interaction between body and mind does 
not deny their conceptual distinction. Here, 
too, the distance from both Antiquity and 
the Middle Age is evident:  
 
For there is within us but one soul, and 
this soul has within it no diversity of 
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parts: it is at once sensitive and rational 
too, and all its appetites are volitions. 42 
 
The unitary conception of the soul defend-
ed by Descartes explicitly denies both the clas-
sical and Medieval conception according to 
which the soul is divisible into hierarchically 
ordered parts or functions: nutritive, sensitive, 
rational, each with different values. Within 
this conceptual context passions pertain to the 
sensitive function: they are by nature subordi-
nate to reason. On the contrary, according to 
Descartes, the functions of the “lowest” pow-
ers (e.g. movement, pain, pleasure) are me-
chanically explained as bodily phenomena, 
while the faculties of the mind (intellect, imag-
ination, perception, will, and passions) are 
unified as conscious thoughts, and therefore 
have direct access to each other.43 This means 
that passion and reason are not hierarchically 
ordered: as thoughts, they share the same on-
tological status and can thus be considered to 
be on the same level, although the passions 
do not provide clear and distinct knowledge 
of the world.  
As perceptions, the passions allow practi-
cal information that can be usefully em-
ployed to help us orient ourselves in the 
world. Therefore, by nature they play a posi-
tive role, although they may be excessive and 
even partially deforming, like magnifying 
lenses.44 Nevertheless, they never pose a 
threat to reason. Descartes is very keen on 
this view of the practical, but cognitive, func-
tion of the passions, the way in which they 
serve as useful tools and can lead us in the 
right direction, towards benefit, or away 
from external danger. In cases where, as ob-
scure and confused perceptions, the passions 
mislead us, reason can master them. This 
does not imply that the body`s role is sec-
ondary, indeed, it remains decisive, given the 
psycho-physical character of the passions. 
What we have is a new, non-hierarchical 
conception of the mind which allows a dif-
ferent cognitive evaluation of the passions 
and, therefore, a different role of them in a 
more general perspective. 
Now that we are acquainted with all the 
passions, we have much less reason for 
anxiety about them than we had before. 
For we see that they are all by nature 
good, and that we have nothing to avoid 
but their misuse or excess.45  
 
The unity of the soul is one of Descartes’ 
most important innovations: everything we 
think or feel, every content of our mind, is an 
idea. Whether clear or confused, more or less 
reliable, it is always a piece of information, 
and can be judged as such, according to its 
degree of clarity. A content of mind is, by its 
nature, to be evaluated from an epistemolog-
ical and not from an ethical point of view. Its 
function is to interpret the world. As a con-
sequence, the passions can no longer be con-
sidered the irrational part of the soul: they 
have cognitive value, and are a precious re-
source for our practical reason, not alien and 
incontrollable powers to be restrained or 
eradicated, not the dangerous powers of a 
corrupt nature, not rebels to tame. They be-
long to the realm of intelligent thought, as in 
the recent “appraisal theories”. This is a radi-
cal and irreversible turning point in the mod-
ern conception of the passions: Spinoza will 
be deeply influenced by it, and the subse-
quent English tradition owes more to it than 
is generally recognized.  
The mind in this new perspective is to be 
distinguished from the mechanical explana-
tion of the body as extended matter, but, as 
already underlined, must not be considered 
as separate from it. When Descartes address-
es the issue of the relations between passions, 
memory, imagination, intellect and will, this 
point is crystal clear. Remembering that the 
passions are caused by animal spirits, we 
need to answer a fundamental practical ques-
tion: what can be done when they are dys-
functional? Flight is not always the appropri-
ate reaction to danger. Fear protects us, but 
sometimes we need the courage to resist and 
attack. We know that our will cannot influ-
ence the passions directly, or instantly 
change an undesirable reaction. Descartes’ 
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explanation of the mechanics of memory and 
of the role of habit plays a crucial role in this 
context. No power of the mind can be con-
sidered to be completely independent from 
the mechanism of the body: not even the in-
tellect, whose “purity” is directly linked to the 
mechanism of vision: «It is the soul which 
sees, and not the eye, and it does not see di-
rectly, but only by means of the brain»46 he 
says in the Dioptrique: there is no vision in 
the soul without body, and there is no intel-
lect intuition without vision. Sensory intui-
tion is a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition for the intellect. In L’homme, Des-
cartes explains the mechanisms of the five 
senses, memory, the passions and of ideas 
themselves on the basis of the activity of the 
brain: 
 
For I wish to apply the term “idea” general-
ly to all the impressions, which the spirits 
can receive as they leave the gland H [the 
pineal gland]. These are to be attributed to 
the “common” sense when they depend on 
the presence of objects […] Here I could 
add something about how the traces of 
these ideas pass through the arteries to the 
heart, and thus radiate through all the 
blood.47 
 
There can be no doubt about the embod-
ied cognition that all intellectual processes 
presuppose in Descartes: many scholars rec-
ognize it today.48 The purity of reason is ex-
plicitly affirmed in the Meditations, when 
Descartes, who is addressing theologians, 
needs to demonstrate the immortality of the 
soul and the existence of God. But in the 
sixth meditation, when he finally demon-
strates the existence of external, physical 
things, the primary role of the body reap-
pears. The faculty of sensory perception is 
passive, i.e. it receives ideas of sensible ob-
jects from another substance, a corporeal na-
ture, which «contains formally [and in fact] 
everything which is to be found objectively 
[or representatively] in the ideas produced by 
this faculty […] They may not all exist in a 
way that exactly corresponds with my senso-
ry grasp of them, for in many cases the grasp 
of the senses is very obscure and confused».49  
Corporeal substance formally (Descartes 
uses here scholastic terminology) contains in 
its nature that which ideas express represent-
atively. Although they do not resemble each 
other – since our mind is not a mirror of the 
corporeal object – body and mind are two 
directly linked substances, in both their 
origin and their everyday functioning. The 
refutation of the metaphor that paints the 
soul as a pilot in a ship follows here: the un-
ion of body and mind is unquestionable.50 
The mechanisms of imagination and 
memory are directly linked to the body and it 
is through these connections that the pas-
sions can be acted upon and pointed, when 
necessary, in a more functional direction. 
Memory is first of all a movement of the pin-
eal gland towards the parts of the brain that 
contain the traces left by an object we want 
to remember. These traces consist only in the 
tendency of the pores to be opened along the 
route where the spirits have previously made 
their way. They are more apt to be opened 
again «in the same way when the spirits 
again flow towards them».51 The mechanism 
of imagination works similarly, opening new 
pores, or new combinations of pores, in a 
new part of the brain. A habit is a constant 
connection between the movement of the 
gland and a thought and therefore if we want 
to act upon our passions the will must change 
this connection.  
Using an analogy with sight, Descartes 
states that it is not sufficient to want to pro-
duce an adjustment in our eyes in order to 
look at a distant object: if we think about en-
larging our pupils, nothing happens, while the 
pupils simply enlarge of their own accord if we 
want to see into the distance. Likewise, «in 
order to arouse boldness and suppress fear in 
ourselves, it is not sufficient to have a volition 
to do so»:52 we have to change a mechanism 
based on memory and habit.  
Since passions are perceptions, they can 
only be changed indirectly, bringing about a 
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movement in the pineal gland in a manner 
that «produces the effect corresponding to 
its volition».53 Since they are emotions, they 
are accompanied by some «disturbances that 
take place in the heart and consequently also 
throughout the blood and in the animal spir-
its»54 that cannot immediately be brought 
under control or changed. Only some sec-
ondary effects can be produced immediately: 
for instance, we can restrain a hand rising in 
anger, but cannot completely control the ac-
companying emotion. 
Imagination and attention to the cause 
and effects of a passion are helpful, but exer-
cise, which aims to induce a new and suitable 
reaction to an emotionally significant event, 
is crucial. However, the potential problem of 
conflict in the soul arises immediately. Since 
Descartes insists that there is within us but 
one soul, with no parts, it is difficult for him 
to provide a consistent explanation for any 
conflict between will and passion. The expla-
nation he does provide is hyper-mechanistic: 
the pineal gland is physically pushed in oppo-
site directions; the conflict (felt in the soul) 
between fear and boldness results from the 
different movements of the spirits in the 
brain and muscles. These movements led 
some philosophers to imagine two different, 
conflicting powers. In fact, the will attempts to 
control this physical opposition and to reori-
ent it in the desired direction. This is the only 
way to change our attitude towards any stimu-
lus that can elicit an emotional response. 
Habit plays an ambivalent role: it consol-
idates our initial appropriate – today we 
might say adaptively positive – reactions to 
external events, but it can also strengthen 
bad or dysfunctional responses, which may 
threaten our internal balance. As soon as we 
are born, nature links every single movement 
of the pineal gland with a thought: this ex-
plains Descartes’ incessant struggle against 
the enormous (although unperceived) influ-
ence of our childhoods on our intellect and 
will, signs of which are found throughout his 
work. His mechanical philosophy does not 
produce puppets. Habits can be changed: the 
technique of dressage is a well-known exam-
ple of this. If we can train (dresser) a horse to 
ignore its instincts, it is clear that such train-
ing will be much more effective with human 
beings. Even though animals do not have a 
soul, and therefore cannot have passions, 
says Descartes, the spirits and the gland (and 
consequently their muscles) all move within 
them, and they can thereby react actively to 
emotionally significant events.55 The dressage 
can change the path of the spirits in the brain 
through the constant repetition of a mechan-
ical task that leads to a new and suitable con-
nection between spirits and thoughts. He 
adds that the same result can also be 
achieved through an immediate recondition-
ing: a disgusting association with something 
we used to like very much can quickly pro-
duce a definitive distance from that thing. 
Conclusion:  
 
Even those who have the weakest souls 
could acquire absolute mastery over all 
passions if we employed sufficient ingenu-
ity (industrie) in training (dresser) and 
guiding (conduire) them.56 
 
█  Classifying 
 
The first part of the treatise deals with the 
nature, causes and effects of the passions, 
which are classified according to their emo-
tional salience, and to whether they can harm 
or benefit us, whether or not they are suitable 
(convenable), useful (utiles) or noxious for 
our well-being. As we will see, the whole Car-
tesian classification is based on this strongly 
connoted lexicon. The subjectivity of its cri-
terion marks an evident discontinuity with 
both Antiquity and the Middle Ages and in-
augurates a new research path, followed by 
Hobbes, Spinoza, Hume, and many others.  
Subjective does not mean, in this context, 
individual: the Cartesian approach is emi-
nently universalistic. There is no space here 
for linguistic, anthropological or epistemic 
differences, in the style of contemporary 
cross-cultural research: the relevance of the 
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origins of concepts and the various ways of 
expressing them, currently considered so im-
portant – although debated by some in the 
field – for the understanding of emotions, are 
completely ignored here. Universality was 
common sense at that time, nor has it been 
abandoned today, even though it is no longer 
assumed without discussion. 
In the general Cartesian analytic method, 
the first task is to identify an order. For clas-
sification purposes an enumeration of the 
passions, le dénombrement, is necessary. This 
corresponds to the fourth rule of the method 
and generally plays a controlling role, ensur-
ing that no step is skipped and that the con-
tinuity of a particular order is guaranteed. 
The order is genealogical, established by the 
analytical method itself, which is a method of 
discovery, showing how the thing in question 
has been found.57 Therefore, the first passion 
to be considered is not the most significant 
from an ethical point of view, but the one 
that leads us to the first encounter with an 
unknown object. At the beginning of our un-
derstanding of the world is wonder (admira-
tion).58 When we are surprised by an unknown 
phenomenon, which may be either beneficial 
or harmful, we are astonished by it, and con-
centrate upon it in order to form a clear and 
distinct idea of it, for practical reason.  
The introduction of wonder marks an ab-
solutely radical departure: none of the tradi-
tional classifications contained it. And yet it 
today appears, as surprise, in all current clas-
sifications. The subjectivity of Descartes’ cri-
terion requires that the first step to be made 
in assessing whether something is good or 
bad for us is to establish a relationship, to get 
in touch with the new object, to experience 
its influence upon us. With the same epis-
temic attitude that compels him to eliminate 
the Aristotelian categories, he renounces any 
objective ethical hierarchy: in order to orient 
ourselves in practical life we need direct ex-
perience of possible benefits or damages. 
Since the concepts provided by the analytical 
method are few and simple, the space left for 
what we need to know directly becomes 
enormously expansive. This explains the 
close, but apparently paradoxical, connection 
between the abstract bodily machine pre-
sented in L’homme and Descartes’ frequent 
visits to the butcher in order to deepen his 
direct knowledge of the body, and test his 
hypothesis. The highest level of abstraction is 
necessarily accompanied by the widest varie-
ty of experiences. The fact that English em-
piricism was deeply inspired, in original 
ways, by Descartes’ philosophical innova-
tions, is no coincidence. 
Once we have experienced the practical 
meaning of an object, we can easily make 
judgements about it and distinguish the ben-
eficial (which we love) from the harmful 
(which we hate). From this basic polarity, all 
other passions can be derived. Given the im-
portance of time, Descartes writes, and the 
fact that passions are usually future-orien-
ted,59 desire comes next, before joy and sad-
ness, which derive from the consideration of 
a present good or evil and arouse positive or 
negative feelings in us.  
These are the six primitive passions, and 
all the others originate in them.60 Descartes 
always strives for simplicity, another factor 
which distances him from tradition. He con-
siders the distinction between the concupis-
cible and the irascible part of the sensory ap-
petite to be valueless: if the soul is not divid-
ed into parts, desire and anger have no classi-
ficatory role. While Aquinas’ classification is 
based on the distinction between the concu-
piscible and the irascible part of the soul, and 
identifies the most relevant passions, the 
Cartesian is based on the simple ones: the 
primitive passions are the basic genera from 
which all other species can be derived. Hope, 
despair, courage, fear, and anger – the five 
irascible passions – traditionally linked in a 
complex way to the vices and virtues – lose 
their importance and are simply classified as 
specifics.61 Spinoza will radicalize this Carte-
sian simplicity, claiming that the classifica-
tion of the passions can be based solely on 
desire and its possible degrees towards more 
or less perfection (joy and sadness), from 
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which all the rest, in various combinations, 
follow. The main theoretical aim is to gain 
scientific, i.e. geometrical, knowledge of the 
passions. We can classify them as, for exam-
ple, triangles or storms, leaving aside any eth-
ical evaluation. This does not mean that they 
do not have a significant ethical role, rather 
they are not vices or virtues by nature.  
The need to differentiate the primary from 
the other passions originates in Antiquity, 
with Aristotle and the Stoics, and is still con-
troversial in contemporary research. Classifi-
cation provides helpful tools with which to 
pursue scientific knowledge that can enable us 
to formulate practical guidance for daily life. 
It is currently based mainly on the measure-
ment of the neural activity elicited by the 
emotions, and on the latter’s external expres-
sion, but methods for identifying and quanti-
fying primary and derivate emotions, and how 
they can be cross-culturally assessed, are ques-
tions still subject to lively scientific debate.62 
His analysis of external expressions is an-
other remarkable achievement of Descartes’ 
treatise. Although the topic was not new, no-
body before him had devoted such deep, fo-
cused attention to the external signs of the 
passions and their bodily mechanism. On this 
question, simplicity was hard to attain:  
 
For it [the expression] consist of many 
changes […] and these are so special and 
slight that we cannot perceive each of 
them separately, though we can easily ob-
serve the result of their conjunction.63  
 
Classification seems a hard, even impossi-
ble, task. Nevertheless, the Cartesian account 
of the expressions is particularly interesting. 
Despite the limited knowledge of the central 
and autonomous nervous systems available to 
the science of that epoch, he clearly under-
stood the significance of immediate and un-
controllable reactions, such as changes in col-
or, trembling, listlessness, fainting, tears, and 
laughter. As William James would later state: 
they are automatic responses to a stimulus and 
cannot be disguised. 
Their basic physical mechanism, a se-
quence of vasodilatation and vasocon-
striction, is easily explained. According to 
Descartes, the fact that these reactions do not 
depend directly on the muscles or nerves, but 
rather on the heart,64 means that the speed, 
abundance, and intensity of blood flowing 
towards or away from the face and bodily ex-
tremities, can explain most of the phenome-
na. Blushing and turning pale are thus easily 
explained, as are trembling, fainting, listless-
ness, tears, and laughter. Blood coming from 
the arterial vein causes the muscles and the 
lungs either to swell or to empty, pushing the 
diaphragm, moving other internal organs 
and causing facial and bodily changes.65 This 
is a very naïve account, although it was at the 
cutting edge of contemporary knowledge. 
Nevertheless, Descartes’ principle, connect-
ing the dynamics of the nervous system – 
which rules the movement of the spirits 
around the heart – to the expressions, does 
not contradict the most recent observations 
on the cortical activity elicited by emotions 
and accompanying their expression. Its con-
sequence is of great importance: 
 
Regarding this, it must be observed that 
they [the passions] are all ordained by na-
ture to relate to the body, and to belong to 
the soul only in so far it is joined to the 
body. Hence, their natural function is to 
move the soul to consent and contribute to 
actions, which may serve to preserve the 
body or render it in some way more per-
fect.66  
 
This explanation of the expressions is typ-
ical of the Cartesian attitude towards the 
mind-body link. Expressions are muscle 
movements, which are to be interpreted as 
visible signs of the passions. Even though 
tears do not “resemble” sadness, and the 
mechanism of their production has nothing 
to do with “feeling sad”, we are capable of 
“reading” them as signs of a psychological 
event in an unprecedented unity of body and 
mind. According to Descartes, it cannot be 
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said that the products of a gland, i.e. tears, 
share the same nature as sadness: the tears 
are only the external signs of the passion, in 
the same way words indicate things without 
mirroring them.67 We can analyze the exter-
nal expression of the passions in order to 
identify some rules for the combination of 
signs which can provide us with a sort of log-
ic of forms, a key to define a stylized, simpli-
fied “alphabet”, useful for deciphering how 
emotions are expressed in different contexts. 
In 1668, the French painter Charles Le Brun 
gave a lecture – eclectically based both on 
Cartesian philosophy and on Marin Cureau 
de la Chambre’s treatises on the passions – in 
which he presented a series of drawings and 
diagrams demonstrating how to paint and 
classify expressions. This series became a 
point of reference not only for painters, but 
also for many scholars, including Darwin.68 
Within the contemporary debate, expres-
sions are considered necessary features of all 
emotions. According to the standard model, 
we cannot speak of an emotion without a 
codified “face”, together with a specific neu-
ral activity, a subjective feeling, and an in-
strumental action. A face is a mobile combi-
nation of parts that can be interpreted as a 
representation of a primary emotion, such as 
surprise, disgust, anger, fear, sadness, or joy, 
as in Ekman’s classification, which is both a 
very useful tool with which to interpret the 
external attitude of individuals and a simpli-
fied schema to help us to understand emo-
tions. Alternatively, it is possible to identify 
the role of each part of an expression: the 
width of a smile, or the height of an eyebrow, 
may be considered a stable sign of a feeling 
that is not ascribed to a single emotion and 
that provides us with a more sophisticated 
and cross-culturally recognizable method. 
According to this view, some of the basic 
components of facial expressions can be con-
sidered in their universal semantic meaning 
(for example “corners of the mouth up” 
cross-culturally means “I feel something good 
now”), unlike in the interesting but question-
able standardization of facial expressions ad-
vanced by Paul Ekman. This approach avoids 
denoting emotions with specific words, such 
as “fear”, “anger”, or “disgust”, which do not 
always have direct counterparts in all cultures 
and languages.69  
The current debate is rich in epistemologi-
cal questions, and benefits from numerous la-
boratory experiments that were impossible in 
the Seventeenth century, but the question of 
“reading faces” as a scientific issue started 
with Descartes and has a long history. Dar-
win’s The Expression of Emotion in Men and 
Animals – the legacy of which is today disput-
ed by scholars70 – is obviously a milestone, but 
the importance of the scientific paradigm shift 
initiated by Descartes is remarkable. And too 
often forgotten. 
 
█  Conclusions 
 
As I have tried to show, Descartes’ inno-
vative approach to the emotions should not 
be considered “obsolete”. His scientific style, 
his re-evaluation of the role played by the 
body in all kinds of knowledge, including the 
passions, and their cognitive value, classifica-
tion and expression, are significant elements 
of his scientific philosophy that are still rele-
vant today. It is important not only to re-
member the historical origins of our concep-
tions, but also to take into account the influ-
ence of some key concepts. The great think-
ers, notwithstanding the limited instruments 
available to them, can still provide us with a 
significant phenomenology of this field 
which will – it is hoped – extend the value of 
contemporary scientific research beyond the 
laboratory and bring about a greater aware-
ness of its broader philosophical significance. 
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